In the wake of recent shipwrecks at the Strait of Sicily, the European Union and its Member States have come under renewed pressure to address rescue at sea. Saving lives at sea is not simply a question of enhancing eu rescue efforts, however, but requires eliminating third party sanctions that significantly impede the proper functioning of the international rescue regime. This article focuses on anti-smuggling laws and related instruments and their thorny relation to humanitarian acts. To improve rescue efforts at sea, as a first step all humanitarian acts need to be exempted from criminal sanctions (including the EU Directive 2002/90/ec). This needs to be accompanied by efforts to desecuritize rescue, separating rescue from border security concerns.
Introduction
In the wake of recent shipwrecks at the Strait of Sicily, the European Union and its Member States have come under renewed pressure to address rescue at sea. 3 October 2013 a boat capsized on its way from Libya to Italy, less than half a mile from the Italian island Lampedusa. From approximately 500 people only 155 were rescued, more than 350 people were presumed to have drowned in the Mediterranean.1 Only a few days later 11 October 2013 another boat capsized, from about 200 people more than 30 drowned, bringing the official count of people who have died over the last two decades trying to reach the southern borders of Europe to more than 20 000.2 These figures are based on bodies counted, cases known, unofficial numbers are much higher, as many drowned remain missing and unknown. Of the 20 000 deaths over the last two decades close to 7000 occurred in the Strait of Sicily, a small, usually easily navigable area of the Mediterranean, between Tunis and Lampedusa about 80 nautical miles wide, extending at its east between Libya and Lampedusa to 180 nautical miles, covered through the Search and Rescue Zones of Malta, Italy, Tunisia and Libya.3 This is a stretch of the Mediterranean that is anything but a deserted area with a significant number of commercial fishing fleets supplemented by military and maritime surveillance, under normal circumstances crossable within 24-48 hours. For many migrant boats, however, it has become a death trap. The paradox of the situation is apparent to most observers. The Italian president Giorgio Napolitano speaks of a 'slaughter of innocents' ,4 Pope Francis of 'vergogna' , shame triggered by complicity,5 and Jack Shenker from the Guardian calls it 'a litany of largely avoidable loss' . 6 There is widespread consensus that these are preventable deaths, but how can they be prevented? Saving lives at sea is not simply a question of enhancing rescue efforts, but requires the elimination of sanctions for rescue at sea that significantly impede and counter the proper functioning of the international rescue regime. 7 The problem is not geography or a lack of capacities, as often portrayed in eu debates, but the sanctioning of rescue. The investigations into the left-to-die boat (2011), which returned after fourteen days adrift in the Strait of Sicily with only eleven of seventy-two passengers alive illustrates merely the tip of the iceberg: Survivors recount encounters with military helicopters, ships and a number of fishing vessels -nobody comes to rescue, however; on the contrary many leave swiftly and even fail to inform the maritime authorities.8 This is not a unique case. Testimonies of passengers and seafarers at the Strait of Sicily confirm a tendency to turn away from boats with irregular migrants, even if in distress, as to avoid costly investigations, detention or possible prosecution, leading to a rising number of people left to their fate at the seas. Many could have been rescued and alive, were it not for lack of fellow human beings ignoring their requests.
While there is a general legal duty to render assistance at sea, over the last decades an increasing number of laws, regulations and practices on national, regional and international levels have effectively discouraged rescue at sea and encouraged seafarers to look away, leading to the incremental institutionalization of a norm of indifference to the lives of migrants. Many of the laws that discourage rescue at sea are embedded in efforts to prevent, criminalize and punish facilitation of crossing borders by third parties -widely known as smuggling, assistance and facilitation -with the declared objectives of protecting victims of smuggling and targeting organised crime. This legislation has provided a fertile ground for the securitization of rescue, and as a result hereof the weakening of the international rescue regime.
Contributing to contemporary eu debates on saving lives at sea, this article analyzes an occasionally present, but largely marginalized aspect of the present debate: legal instruments and practices that discourage rescue. Thereby, it focuses on anti-smuggling laws and related instruments and analyzes their thorny relation to humanitarian acts. Starting with a study of eu proposals to save lives at sea, part two addresses the fault lines between security and rescue. Through the cases of Cap Anamur (2009) and Morthada/El-Hedi (2009), part three demonstrates the adverse effects of anti-smuggling laws on third party rescue at sea. Part four addresses the inherent challenges of antismuggling laws in protecting humanitarian acts. The conclusion contains some thoughts and recommendations on safeguarding humanitarian acts in Reinforced border surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean (6 action points) and 5. Assistance and solidarity with Member States dealing with high migration pressures (4 action points).
The Communication underlines three co-supportive agendas for reducing deaths at sea: a prevention agenda, a security agenda and a rescue agenda. The prevention agenda seeks to prevent migrants from reaching the coastal shore as to be able to commence their maritime journey; it seeks both to incentivize migrants to use legal routes and equally deter them through security measures from boarding. This agenda is targeted primarily through cooperation with third countries (area 1), alternative legal avenues (area 2) and by deterrence through reinforced border surveillance. The security agenda is reflected in efforts to counter smuggling, trafficking and organised crime (area 3) and to increase border surveillance (area 4), both together underlying the importance of strengthening policing efforts. In contrast to the prevention and security agenda, the rescue agenda of the European Union, focusing on saving lives at seas is narrowly conceived. No specific area is dedicated to rescue at sea; the very word rescue appears only in 2 of the 38 action points (points 1.9 and 3.8) and actions that seek to improve safety of migrants on the seas, target questions of safe passage or saving lives at sea are limited in the Communication to less than a handful of points.
2.2
The Rescue Agenda The eu's rescue agenda, focusing on saving lives on the seas, is not only marginal to the Communication, but to a large extent merged with and even subsumed under the security agenda. Under area 4, 'Reinforced border surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean' , rescue is largely equated with enhanced border surveillance. The Communication promotes a joint security/rescue agenda of border security and protection of lives under the aegis of Frontex, built upon the supposition that it is possible and efficient to address security concerns and rescue efforts together. The 'objective is to have a comprehensive and coordinated approach to border surveillance operations led by Frontex in the Mediterranean (from Cyprus to Spain)' (point 4.1).18 To increase operational and coordination capacities for rescue missions, the Communication proposes the reinforcement of Frontex, complemented by technological fortification through Eurosur and legal buttressing through The Frontex Sea Borders Regulation.
More specifically, the rescue agenda of the eu consists of the following three parts: First and primarily, it seeks to enhance the role of Frontex. Frontex built upon institutional, technological and legal reinforcement of the current eu approach to the Mediterranean, seeking to integrate rescue within border control measures. The rescue agenda is built upon the assumption that a proper functioning of the rescue regime is hampered due to a lack of operational capacities and coordination to detect vessels and provide timely help. It proposes to overcome this deficiency through enhanced border surveillance. Greater levels of harmonization in information-sharing, decision-making and common operations, combined with an increase of surveillance capacities, it is argued, will lead to less loss of lives at sea. These solutions stem from a specific form of constituting the problem.25 The problem of migrant death at sea is hereby reduced to a natural problem of crossing the seas in unseaworthy vessels, a problem of geography and insufficient/uncoordinated rescue coverage, which can be countered by technical solutions stressing sufficient surveillance and operational coverage for better implementing the international rescue regime. This ignores the wider problematic of political and security issues at interplay causing and contributing to death at sea. Saving lives at sea is not simply a question of enhancing rescue efforts, but also a question of eliminating sanctions as to permit widespread rescue efforts and allow the proper functioning of the international rescue regime.
2.3
Some Points Towards A Sanctions Agenda In relation to the 3 October incident, Tom Kington from The Guardian is one of the very few to stress an important, but often neglected point: 'After reports that some fishing boats had ignored the sinking vessel, local fisherman said they were often hesitant to pick up migrants at sea since they risked their boats being seized under Italy's tough laws on illegal migrants.'26 Similarly, in the 2011 investigation of the left-to-die boat, which returned after 14 days adrift in the Strait of Sicily with only eleven of seventy-two passengers alive, the Rapporteur to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tineke Strik, stresses that certain measures 'negatively affect the willingness of fishing vessels and other commercial shipping to fulfil their obligation of rescue at sea' including amongst these 'the threat of criminal sanctions for aiding and abetting irregular migrants' .27 These statements only illustrate the tip of the iceberg. Testimonies of migrants and seafarers at the Strait of Sicily confirm a tendency to turn away from boats with irregular migrants, even if in distress, as to avoid costly investigations, detention or possible prosecution, leading to a rising number of people left to drown at seas. An important factor hereby are criminal sanctions imposed by anti-smuggling legislation and their adverse effects on rescue. This issue has also not remained unnoticed on the eu level.
The need to exempt humanitarian acts from criminal sanctions and security concerns is placed -even if marginally -on the eu agenda. In its resolution from October 2013, in response to the 3 October incident, the European Parliament acknowledges and calls upon 'eu and Member States to amend or review any legislation sanctioning people assisting migrants in distress at sea' and requests 'the Commission to review Council Directive 2002/90/EC' .28 This is taken up by the Task Force Mediterranean, acknowledging the effect of sanctions and more specifically the negative effect of criminal sanctions on humanitarian acts in its Communication in two action points: Point 3.8 under the area 'Fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime' highlights that the Commission will evaluate, and if needed modify, Directive 2002/90 'by reconciling effective fight against smuggling with the need to avoid criminalising humanitarian assistance.' Point 4.6 under the area 'Reinforced border surveillance contributing to enhancing maritime situational picture and to the protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean' emphasizes the need to provide mariners 'public reassurance' that 'provided they are acting in good faith, [they] would not face any negative legal consequences for providing . . . assistance' . These action points stress for the first time the criminalization of third party rescue as a possible result of anti-smuggling and related legislation. Whilst these are laudable efforts, the question of sanctions remains insufficiently addressed in terms of its significance and in terms of its complexity. In the following we shall seek to address these issues more in-depth by focusing on anti-smuggling laws and their relation to humanitarian acts. The challenges of protecting humanitarian acts shall be explored through the cases of Cap Anamur (2009) and Morthada/El Hedi (2009) in part three, followed by an analysis of anti-smuggling laws and their inherent difficulty in protecting humanitarian acts in part four.
On Anti-Smuggling Laws and Adverse Effects
Two prosecutions had an important impact on the transnational community of fishermen at the Strait of Sicily31 and compellingly illustrate the role of antismuggling laws in sanctioning rescue. Even though all defendants are eventually acquitted the cases of Cap Anamur (2009) and Morthada/El-Hedi (2009) demonstrate that rescue at sea is a sanctioned enterprise and greatly influence the conduct of seafarers, willing to increasingly turn away from boats with irregular migrants, even if in distress, as to avoid crime by association, costly investigations and possible prosecutions, leading to a number of people left to their fate at seas. In both cases defendants claim rescue; the prosecution claims aiding and abetting crime by assisting/ smuggling irregular migrants.
3.1
The Trials of Agrigento The first trial is against three members of the organisation Cap Anamur.32 Cap Anamur is a humanitarian organisation founded in 1979, at the height of the minimum rules for penalties, applicable both to natural persons and legal persons, stressing that Member States shall ensure that infringements shall be punishable by criminal penalties (Framework Decision, Article 1.1). Charges of assisting irregular entry are based on two claims: the meaning of procuring a profit and a false declaration to gain access to debarkation. The prosecutor claims that defendants had sought to procure a profit through their action, specifying that 'to procure a profit whether direct or indirectalso consisted in the advertising and international publicity obtained in the sale of third-party images and information relative to the facts of the process' .34 Further, the defendants are accused of false declaration of a medical emergency as to be allowed to disembark and facilitate illegal entry.35 The Cap Anamur case not only demonstrates the uses of anti-smuggling law, but also that the distinction between for-profit and non-profit assistance provides an uneasy separation between criminal and non-criminal acts -a point to which Even though both cases eventually end in acquittal for the defendants, they prove that rescue at sea is a sanctioned enterprise and shape future human conduct at seas. The trials increase and expose costs associated with rescue and substantially elevate barriers for rescue at sea. Rescue at sea becomes an operation that small fishing boats and even larger commercial vessels cannot afford. The trials last for many years absorbing the energies and economic resources of the accused; the suspects are detained, some placed under house arrest; the vessels are confiscated over prolonged periods of time; the boats of the Tunisian fishermen become unusable due to damages and after the trial their licences for fishing on the high seas are denied, effectively amounting to loss of their economic livelihoods.40 As Captain Schmidt expresses in a sombre assessment of the verdict '[i]f seafarers at sea notice a refugee boat, they know, that we stood trial for three years. The acquittal does then perhaps not play an important role anymore.'41 The process amounts to punishment.42 Hence, even in the absence of civil or criminal penalties, the costs of the criminal procedure effectively provide for a sanction and deterrence function. This is intentional. As the prosecutor of Agrigento, Ignacio de Francisci, highlights it is important 'to avoid the repetition of these kinds of actions, even if they happen due to a noble purpose' .43
These cases demonstrate how even a duty, anchored in national and international law, can be selectively undermined (targeting irregular migrants only) through a system of legal sanctions. Anti-smuggling legislation can be used to sanction rescue, even though rescue is firmly anchored in national and international legislation. The duty to render assistance is codified in various international conventions, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (solas), the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (sar) and the 1989 International Convention on Salvage (salvage). More specifically, Italian legislation provides for the duty to render assistance at sea in the Navigation Code,44 but also provides for a more general assistance in the Italian Civil and the state of necessity clause in the Penal Code45 and even explicitly exempts relief efforts and humanitarian 41 assistance in the consolidated immigration legislation.46 Even though there is a general legal duty to render assistance at sea, supported by various humanitarian clauses, ultimately these clauses fail to exempt seafarers from criminal prosecution. As demonstrated through the Agrigento trials, prosecution is sufficient to subvert a positive duty, a demand to act rather than to restrain from an action.
3.2
Legal Framework At stake are in both cases aiding and abetting crime under the Italian penal code in the matter of clandestine immigration and for disregarding orders of disembarkation.47 The legal basis of both cases is the 1998 Legislative Decree 286/1998 (Turco-Napolitano Act), which consolidated immigration legislation and contains clauses that criminalize the facilitation and smuggling of migrants.48 The relevant articles hereto are: Article 12(1) specifies that facilitation of unauthorized entry can be punished by fines of up to €15,000 and imprisonment of up to three years, even if conducted without purpose of financial gain. Article 12(3) declares aggravating circumstances for organised crime, that is if three or more persons committed the crime for profit and facilitated the entry of five or more persons. Under aggravating circumstances 4-12 years of imprisonment and fines of €15,000 for each person entered are foreseen. It is important to understand that the subversion of duties through antismuggling laws is not an Italian problem, a question of inconsistent legal practice or otherwise due to unique circumstances. This legislation and its history reflect a widespread mounting normative consensus on the need to criminalize smugglers, held culpable for the suffering and death of migrants, leading to an incessant call for more severe forms of criminalization of smuggling, trafficking and organised crime, and, thus, creating the foundation for a multiplication of laws and an increase penalties. Hereby, often assistance, smuggling and trafficking is discursively combined to one homogenous group of exploiters of human misery, prying on the vulnerability of their victims, held responsible for putting 'people's lives at risk in small, overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels' .49 They are found guilty of providing unseaworthy vessels, without proper guidance and support, insufficiently informing their clients about the risk, and imprudently limiting availability of water and food.50 Any assistance to cross borders irregularly is presented in this framework as ruthless organised crime with disregard for human life and human safety. This response is shared -in a rare instance of unity -by security agencies, humanitarian organisations and civil society critiques alike. 51 It is within this rising normative consensus that there is an increasing resort to legal instruments on national, European and international levels to punish and criminalize smuggling. In Italy facilitating unauthorized entry becomes a criminal offence in 1986, limited then in its scope to unauthorized entry for labour exploitation only (Law 943/1986)52 and is extended in its scope in Rather than a mono-directional legislative dissemination, these diverse initiatives and efforts at criminalizing smuggling need to be understood as concurring trends on national, European and international levels, with reinforcing effects upon each other, equally providing an increasing justificatory arsenal for criminalizing assistance. The situation in Italy reflects European and international developments. Hence, to a certain extent, it is these legal instruments that are equally tested in the 2009 trials against Cap Anamur and Morthada/El-Hedi. The trials illustrate the fundamentally complicated relationship between anti-smuggling legislations and humanitarian acts: the adverse effect of anti-smuggling laws and the difficulty of protecting humanitarian acts from criminal sanctions. The next section will focus on the legal instruments and explore the difficulties of setting clear boundaries between smuggling and humanitarian acts as a problem inherent to anti-smuggling legislation and related instruments. 
4
The Challenge of Protecting Humanitarian Acts
Whereas at first sight the distinction between acts of smuggling and rescue appear to be obvious, anti-smuggling laws demonstrate the difficulties of setting an impermeable boundary between humanitarian acts and criminal acts, and a resulting ambivalence between protection and criminalization of humanitarian acts. The following will provide an analysis of the multiple relations of anti-smuggling legislation to humanitarian acts, to illustrate the fluid boundaries between criminal acts and humanitarian acts -as to understand the difficulty of protecting humanitarian acts. More specifically, we will focus on the for-profit/non-profit distinction (Section 4.1), the scope of criminalization (Section 4.2), and their effects upon social relations (Section 4.3) to understand the challenges of protecting rescue within anti-smuggling legislation.
4.1
The Protection of Humanitarian Acts: For Profit/Non-Profit Distinctions At the outset anti-smuggling legislation appears to safeguard humanitarian acts from criminalization by excluding them from their subject matter. The international anti-smuggling convention, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (untoc) and its Protocols, recommend the deployment of criminal sanctions for smuggling migrants (sm, Article 6), but exclude humanitarian acts from its subject matter through the very definition of smuggling. According to the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (sm) 'smuggling of migrants' refers to the 'procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident' (Article 3(a) ). The element of financial or material gain is crucial to the definition of smuggling; humanitarian and other non-profit acts, even if they contribute to the irregular entry of a person, are not to be considered as smuggling and, hence, do not fall under the Convention. This approach is also underlined through secondary sources, such as the Model Law Interpretation, which states:
The reference in this definition to 'a financial or other material benefit' was included in order to emphasize that the intention was to include the activities of organised criminal groups acting for profit, but to exclude the activities of those who provided support to migrants for humanitarian reasons or on the basis of close family ties. As noted in the interpretative notes, it was not the intention of the Protocol to criminalize the Through a distinction between for-profit and non-profit acts as part of the smuggling definition, untoc and its Protocols provide an, albeit implicit, protection of humanitarian acts.58 This distinction between commercial and humanitarian approaches was also crucial for the Schengen Convention of 1990, limiting penalties for assistance to irregular migration, including assistance to enter or reside, to purposes of gain (Article 27.1).59
The 2002 States to refrain from prosecuting humanitarian actors and providing this as an option only, the eu legislation is accused of opening up possibilities for targeting humanitarian actors with criminal sanctions.62 This is also at the heart of the eu proposals to lift sanctions against rescue. Undoubtedly, the 2002 eu Directive needs to be brought in line with untoc and its Protocols and re-establish the distinction between for-profit and non-profit motives; this would be necessary to confirm the legal norm, but still not be sufficient to safeguard humanitarian acts from anti-smuggling and related legislation. It is often assumed that the non-distinctive nature of eu legislation poses the root of the problem, to be remedied by applying international standards. The challenges of protecting humanitarian acts is, however, more complex. Even the boundaries set by untoc between for-profit and non-profit acts are blurred, leading to vague and imprecise distinctions between smuggling and humanitarian acts. Anti-smuggling laws that seek to safeguard humanitarian acts try to differentiate between acts according to the motives of the actors: criminal sanctions need to be motivated by commercial objectives, distinct from non-commercial, altruistic and humanitarian objectives. These legal distinctions are closely intertwined with moral distinction drawing a boundary between self-motivated and other-motivated intent of associations, between material gain and altruistic support. Whilst this distinction is supposed to guarantee the protection of humanitarian acts, it also leaves room for contestation, blurring the boundaries between humanitarian and criminal conduct. According to the sm Protocol, for example, each state party is required to 'adopt such legislative and other measure as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit' (Article 6). Whilst the concept of intentional direct financial benefit may appear to be clear, indirect and other material benefits open significant possibilities for contestation. As demonstrated in the Cap Anamur case, the definition of what counts as material benefit is contested even for humanitarian organisations -demonstrating that even the for-profit/non-profit distinction can be easily used to prosecute humanitarian actors.
4.2
The Protection of Humanitarian Actors: On the Scope of Legislation A further problem relating to the protection of humanitarian acts arises from the scope of the legislation. Even though untoc and its Protocols seek to target transnational organised crime, a cursory look reveals that many of sm Protocol's clauses help construct a broad scope of criminalization. Article 34(2) broadens the scope of the Convention beyond transnational organised crime by stating that neither the principles of 'transnationality' nor that of 'organised criminal group' are required as elements when drafting domestic legislation. Or more explicitly '[t]hus the offences established in accordance with the Protocol should apply equally, regardless of whether they were committed by individuals or by individuals associated with an organized criminal group, and regardless of whether this can be proved or not' .63 This implies that any relations between irregular migrants and individuals, with or without transnational connections, with or without an organized criminal component, can be targeted, thus expanding the scope of criminal conduct, and paving the way for blurring the boundaries between criminal and humanitarian conduct.
The 2002 Directive has an even broader target population of sanctions. It does not only obscure the distinction between smugglers and rescuers, by rendering the protection of humanitarian actors optional, but also increases the scope of criminal sanctions. The 2002 Directive targets not only direct but also indirect aid, and extends identical sanctions from the person committing or attempting to commit the crime to accomplices and instigators alike (Article 2). This leaves humanitarian actors in a potentially lethal legal minefield as being an instigator, however defined, will suffice to draw criminal penalties. Again, whilst the 2002 eu Directive needs to be brought in line with untoc and its Protocols, this would not be sufficient to safeguard humanitarian actors. This leads us to the most fundamental problem of anti-smuggling and related legislation as regards to safeguards for humanitarian acts and actors, the creation of suspicion.
4.3
The Protection of Humanitarian Acts: Suspicion and Social Relations Anti-smuggling and related legislations create a broad suspect category. Any third party interaction related to the entry or crossing of borders of irregular migrants, even if not criminalized, becomes open for scrutiny -as to investigate whether the acts in question fall under smuggling or related acts, whether they are pursued under the qualifying circumstances of financial or other material gain. This allows essentially placing anybody related to these actswhether for gain, exploitation or not -in the suspect category, opening the possibility of prosecution. This is embedded within a wider mounting legal and normative consensus of criminal sanctions against third parties, not only for crossing borders, but also for providing employment, housing and other social interaction.64
By criminalizing certain acts and qualifying them as smuggling, antismuggling legislation creates a distinction between legally authorized and unauthorized interactions between irregular migrants and the general public. Whilst untoc and its Protocols still limit unauthorized interactions largely to commercial interactions, eu legislation weakens these boundaries by dissolving the distinctions between for-profit and non-profit interactions, between commercial interactions and protection for humanitarian and family motives. It re-negotiates the boundaries between authorized and unauthorized interaction and by that also between criminal acts and humanitarian acts. Thus, it has the potential to criminalize all interactions between irregular migrants and the general public, if related to crossing the international border, and to ultimately dissolve the protection of humanitarian acts, effectively criminalizing and punishing not only economic, but any kind of social interactions with irregular migrants, including family relations and humanitarian acts.
As the boundaries between criminal acts and humanitarian acts are fluid, third parties, whatever their motives may be, can be governed in similar ways, based upon suspicion -and possibly criminalization -for their interaction with irregular migrants crossing borders. This has an important impact upon societal relations, widening the gap between irregular migrants and the general population, leading eventually to lower levels of engagement with the suffering of irregular migrants. Whilst an explicit protection of humanitarian acts is urgently needed to set the proper normative standards, it is likely to be insufficient to avoid all implications of anti-smuggling laws, as these criminal laws invoke a general level of insecurity, anxiety and securitization targeting third parties in touch with irregular migrants.
Conclusion
Saving lives at sea is not simply a question of enhancing the eu rescue efforts, but primarily a question of eliminating sanctions and facilitating third party rescue efforts. Understanding the current problem not as a natural problem of geography and capacities, but as the result of the incremental securitization of rescue requires a different set of responses on saving lives at sea than those proposed by the eu. Hereby, it is important to point out that it is not rescue in the Mediterranean as such that poses a challenge, but the problem is limited to the rescue of irregular migrants. Enhancing rescue efforts will remain insufficient as long as rescue of irregular migrants is not decriminalized and desecuritized. All seafarers that fulfil their duty to render assistance at sea should be protected and even more supported through eu legislation. eu policies need to desecuritize the Mediterranean to avoid further lives lost at sea and to allow seafarers to follow their international duties without fear of punishment. Concretely, the following steps are required: First, an important means in eliminating sanctions that impede rescue at seas is the elimination of criminal sanctions imposed by anti-smuggling laws for humanitarian acts, requiring a modification of the Council Directive 2002/90/ec defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence. Equally all humanitarian acts need to be legally exempted from criminal and administrative sanctions in letter an in practice. An implicit protection of humanitarian acts, based upon a distinction between for-profit and non-profit acts, or an optional protection is insufficient. eu institutions need to endorse an explicit protection of humanitarian acts and provide easy possibilities of appeal by individuals and organisations for restrictions imposed. Whilst these steps might not be sufficient, at least they will allow for a normative consensus, anchored in law, for the protection of rescue and other humanitarian acts.
Second, rescue needs to be disentangled from border security issues. Currently, steps towards decriminalizing rescue continue to be embedded in a program of border security, subordinated to wider security concerns. This renders the rescue agenda highly vulnerable as it becomes merged with and even subsumed under security concerns. A joint rescue/security agenda is untenable, due to their conflicting nature. As one may need to be prioritized over the other, saving lives can be subordinated to broader security concerns. Embedding rescue within security is likely to continue the securitization of rescue and is unable to efficiently tackle the problem of third party sanctions. Ultimately, embedding rescue within security will privilege rescue operations by border security agencies and marginalize third party rescue efforts.
Many of the proposals by the eu's Task Force Mediterranean continue with current policies of prevention, security and rescue, increasing operational capacities of Frontex and the Member States, supplemented by border surveillance technologies. The last decade has, however, illustrated that more of the same is not better. In spite of the number of people saved, it is evident that these policies have so far not succeeded in reducing the death toll. On the contrary, the death toll at European borders seems to be incessantly increasing. Concentrating solely on the European Union's rescue capacities is under these circumstances not sufficient; it is important to consider the concerns that impede rescue by seafarers. The elimination of sanctions to rescue is a first step in the right direction, but it needs to be complemented by desecuritization efforts to be effective. Ultimately, the success of policies for saving lives can only be measured against a diminishing death toll at the borders.
